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Abstract 
A bill to amend the section of the FODEA Law that regulates the rescheduling 
of loans was introduced in the Costa Rican Congress in July, 1988 (FODEA 11). The 
main reforms featured in the bill are outlined in this paper, which also contains an 
analysis of the effects that the bill may have on the Costa Rican National Banking 
System and on the nation's farmers, on the basis of an evaluation of the consequences 
of FODEA I. 
The analysis reveals that the FODEA portfolio has been highly concentrated 
among a small number of farmers, particularly livestock producers of the Guanacaste 
region. Because of the low interest rates charged on the rescheduled loans, the subsidy 
granted to agricultural borrowers by the FODEA Law has also become highly con-
centrated. If implemented, the FODEA II bill would not only increase this concentration 
of the FODEA portfolio, but it may also contribute to further exacerbate the revenue 
and liquidity losses that the banks have already experienced as a consequence of the 
FODEA Law. 
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STUDY OF THE BILL TO REFORM THE FODEA LAW: 
FODEA II 
Luis Mesalles * 
Introduction 
In May, 1987, the "Ley de Fomento a la Producci6n A&t'Qpecuaria,," better known 
as the FODEA Law, was approved by Congress. This legislation was aimed mainly at 
reactivating the agricultural sector, specially the livestock sub-sector, from what was 
considered to be a major crisis. 1 
In order to assist the agricultural sector, the Law contained, among other things, 
an authorization for the Ministry of Finance to issue CR$5 billion in bonds, to buy a 
portion of the portfolio in arrears of the state-owned banks. The loans of small and 
medium farmers already in arrears before June 1986 qualified for rescheduling, at low 
interest rates, with a sixteen-year payback period, and four years of grace. Small farmer 
loans were rescheduled at 8 percent during the first four years and at 10 points below 
the basic deposit interest rate during the remaining 12 years. Medium farmer loans were 
rescheduled at 12 percent during the grace period, and at 6 points below the basic 
deposit interest rate afterwards. This portion of the portfolio was then bought by the 
Government, in exchange for the bonds. 
Large farmer loans were also rescheduled by the banks. In this case, however, 
the Government did not buy out the loans. Instead, the banks were forced to carry the 
burden of the rescheduling, according to the terms established by the Law. Specifically, 
the loans of the large farmers were rescheduled at a 15 percent interest rate during the 
1 
2 
four-year grace period, and then at a rate equivalent to the basic interest rate, during 
the remaining 12 years. 
Fifteen months after the FODEA Law was approved, in July 1988, a bill to reform 
part of it was introduced by Congressman Mufi.oz Bustos. The new initiative is called 
"Bill to R~form Arti<(les 1. 6. 7. 8. 9. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 18. and 21 of Law NQ. 7064. 
l&y de FomentQ a le& Produccion Aifopecuaria,," and is commonly known as FODEA II. 
In supporting FODEA II, Congressman Munoz Bustos argued that, notwithstanding 
FODEA's positive role in helping to alleviate some of the problems of the agricultural 
sector, continued government policies of disincentive to this sector, combined with 
droughts that affected the country during the past few years, had exacerbated the crisis 
and, thus, had further discouraged farmers from remaining in the agricultural sector. 
Congressman Mufi.oz Bustos argued that FODEA had been inadequate, as well, partly 
because the final draft of the Law provided an opportunity for the banks not to develop 
much interest in rescheduling farmer loans. Consequently, he felt that many farmers had 
not been able to reschedule their loans and had not become creditworthy again. State-
owned bank officers claim, on the other hand, that they have done as much as possible 
to follow the guidelines of the FODEA Law, but that farmers have not come to the 
banks to complete their paperwork. 
The main objective of the bill is to reform a part of the section in the FODEA 
Law that deals with the rescheduling of loans (Chapter I). It calls for an increase from 
CR$5 billion to CR$10 billion in the amount of bonds issued by the Government, to be 
devoted to the purchase of the arrears portfolio of the banks from small and medium 
farmers. In order to allow for more producers to qualify for the preferential interest 
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rates, so that the rescheduled portfolio financed by the Government becomes larger, the 
bill raises the maximum level of debt used to classify a farmer as a small or as a 
medium borrower. At the same time, in order to give more farmers the opportunity to 
benefit from the rescheduling of loans, the bill includes changes in procedures that would 
facilitate the paperwork for farmers. 
The main reforms introduced by the FODEA II bill are analyzed in this paper. 
The current status of the bill as well as its political feasibility are examined, in order to 
assess its chances of approval by Congress. An evaluation of some of the effects that 
the FODEA Law has had on the banks and on farmers is also provided. The possible 
effects of the FODEA II bill on the banks and on farmers are then evaluated in the 
final section of the paper, on the basis of the actual consequences of the first FODEA. 
Main Reforms Proposed 
The main changes to the FODEA law introduced in the new bill are: 
(1) an increase from CR$5 billion to CR$10 billion of the authorization to the 
Ministry of Finance to issue "Public Sector Rescheduling Bonds," for the purpose of 
buying the arrears portfolio related to small and medium farmers held by state-owned 
banks; 
(2) an increase in the limits that define a small farmer, from CR$2 million to 
CR$4 million in original debt, and from CR$2.5 million to CR$4.5 million in agricultural 
assets; 
(3) an increase of the limits that define a medium farmer, from CR$5 million to 
CR$7 million in original debt, but leaving the limit on agricultural assets at CR$12 
4 
million, as stated in the original· FODEA Law. As a result, the lower limit on original 
debt for classification as a large farmer is increased from CR$5 million to CR$7 million; 
( 4) the state-owned banks are required to accept real estate from farmers in 
partial or total payment of a loan, while the banks are authorized (but not required) to 
accept other types of assets as well;2 
(5) the bill requires that the banks surrender their right to freely negotiate which 
assets may be accepted as payment for a loan. Instead, the bill creates a "State Inter-
Institutional Commission," to be appointed by the Ministry of Agriculture, to coordinate 
the management and sale of these assets. Preference would have to be given to public 
institutions that might need the assets for their own programs; 
( 6) the bill forces the banks to reschedule the loans of those borrowers who had 
disposed of the assets offered as collateral. The FODEA Law, instead, merely allowed 
the banks to do so if so desired; 
(7) the wording of the Law is changed from reschedule (adecuar), to reschedule 
and re-reschedule (adecuar y readecuar). In this way, the bill would allow farmers who 
had already arrived at an agreement with the banks regarding their defaulted loans, 
before the FODEA Law was enacted, to benefit from the new terms and conditions 
introduced by the law;3 and 
(8) the bill calls for a moratorium, with respect to principal and interest, of five 
to ten years, for those farmers who want to remain as agricultural producers, but who 
cannot meet their borrowing obligations, due to adverse circumstances derived from price 
or weather factors. The need for a moratorium would be determined on an individual 
basis by the banks. 
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Political Feasibility of FODEA II 
At present, the FODEA II bill will be the first item on the agenda of the 
Agricultural Commission in Congress, when it reconvenes on the first week of September 
for its ordinary period of sessions. During the month of August, Congress was in the 
midst of an extraordinary period of sessions, during which it can only study bills sent by 
the Executive. The Agricultural Commission studied, during that period, an environ-
mental bill related to "Green Peace." 
The fact that the Executive did not send the FODEA II bill to the extraordinary 
session of Congress shows the little interest that it has in this bill. The Ministry of 
Agriculture gave a negative report on the bill to the Commission, and has urged the 
legislators to be cautious, indicating that the full effects of FODEA are still not known, 
and focusing on the detrimental impact that FODEA II might have on the loan recovery 
efforts of the banks. The Ministry of Agriculture is at present preparing an alternative 
bill, which would replace the FODEA II bill. In it, the emphasis would be on solving 
the agricultural sector's crisis through institutional changes, rather than on engaging in 
additional rescheduling of loans. 4 
Meanwhile, most of the Congressmen from both major parties (Llberaci6n and 
Unidad) who are members of the Agricultural Commission have shown interest in the 
approval of the bill. Some Congress analysts consider that the chances for the Agri-
cultural Commission to approve the bill when the ordinary sessions of Congress are 
reconvened in September are very good. 
6 
Some Congressmen, however, are attempting to introduce reforms to other 
chapters of the FODEA law, not related to the rescheduling of loans. Particularly, a 
motion for the creation of the Ministry of Natural Resources has been introduced. This 
motion has caused some controversy in the Agricultural Commission, which might prolong 
the deliberations on the bill, making it more difficult for it to be approved by Congress 
before the current term expires in April, 1990. 5 
Time is an additional factor against the bill's approval. Even if it is approved by 
the Agricultural Commission in the very short term, the bill will be placed at about the 
two hundredth position in the order of the Plenario for Congress, before it can come to 
the full floor. The bill would need the approval of at least two thirds of Congress to 
be moved up to a better position in the order of the agenda, which is unlikely to 
happen, since there are other projects of higher priority for Congress and the Executive. 
This is the case of the "Structural Adjustment Loan 11" bill, better known as PAE ll. and 
of the Central American Parliament bill, which the Executive is urging Congress to 
approve as soon as possible. 
In addition, the month of November is spent in Congress studying the Fiscal 
Budget. After that, and because of the national elections to be held in February, 
Congressmen are likely to declare a holiday during the months of December and January, 
to incorporate themselves into the political campaign. 
At the same time, the main groups that would benefit from this bill, which seem 
to be the cattle and rice producers, as was the case with the first FODEA, have this time 
not exerted much pressure on Congress for the approval of the bill, compared to their 
earlier lobbying. Those most interested in the Law have already rescheduled their loans. 
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The possibilities of the FODEA II bill to be approved, before the term of the 
present Congress expires in April 1990, are not very good, therefore. As some Congress 
advisors claimed, however, Congress is like a "Pandora's Box," where anything can 
happen, specially during an election period. It must also be noted that the FODEA Law 
was approved by Congress unanimously. 
EtTects of FODEA on the Farmers 
Even though detailed information on the distribution of the FODEA portfolio at 
the different banks was hard to obtain, it is easily established that there are some 
differences between the preliminary estimates and the actual rescheduling that took 
place.6 Particularly, far less large farmers have rescheduled their loans, than small and 
medium farmers, as compared to what was expected, as shown in Table 1. Only about 
60 percent of the large farmer portfolio that qualified for FODEA in the Banco Nacional 
de Costa Rica (BNCR), and 25 percent in the Banco de Costa Rica (BCR), was 
rescheduled. On the other hand, nearly 96 percent of the portfolio of small and medium 
farmers in the BCR was rescheduled, while in the BNCR more than what was expected 
from these categories was rescheduled. 
As expected, the distribution of the rescheduled portfolio was highly concentrated 
in the livestock sector. About 65 percent of the rescheduled loans of the entire banking 
system belong to the livestock sector (Tables 2, 3 and 4 ). 
Rice producers are another group that was highly favored by the FODEA law. 
It is estimated that around 10 percent of the loans rescheduled by the Banco Nacional 
belong to this group. In contrast, around 2 percent of these loans were from bean and 
corn producers. 
~ 
Estimated 
Actual 
BCR 
Estimated 
Actual 
8 
Table 1 
Costa Rica: National Banking System. 
FODEA's Estimated and Actual Portfolio Distribution, 
by Bank and Farmer's Size, as of June 1989. 
(Million colones ). 
Small Medium Large 
706.8 788.2 1,165.6 
2168.5 696.5 
1,136.9 545.8 988.5 
970.8 639.5 248.5 
BNCR: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
BCR: Banco de Costa Rica. 
Total 
2,660.6 
2,865.0 
2,681.3 
1,859. 2 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Departments of Economic Studies of 
the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the Banco de Costa Rica. 
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Table 2 
Costa Rica: National Banking System. 
Portfolio Distribution of Rescheduled Loans under the FODEA Law, 
by Sector of Productive Activity and Source of Financing.* 
June 1989. (Million colones). 
BNCR BCR BAC BCAC Total 
cartera Propia 
Agriculture 312.8 172.0 87.7 23.5 596.0 
Livestock 762.2 323.4 201.1 37.9 1,324.6 
Rest 13.9 9.4 5.3 
--2..& 2§.6 
1,088.9 504.8 294.1 61.4 1,949.2 
Fideicomiso 
Agriculture 521.7 373.0 275.5 112.8 1,283.0 
Livestock 748.2 1,072.6 500.6 76.4 2,397.8 
Rest 29.§ ~~!~ ~8.4 o.o 122.6 
1,299.7 1,490.0 824.5 189.2 3,803.4 
Carter a Propia and Fideicomiso 
Agriculture 834.5 545.0 363.2 136.3 1,879.0 
Livestock 1,510.4 1,396.0 701.7 114.3 3,722.4 
Rest 43.7 53!8 53.7 o.o 151.2 
2,388.6 1,994.8 1,118.6 250.6 5,752.6 
* Cartera Propia consists mainly of large farmer loans, which each bank has to finance 
with its own funds, while Fideicomiso consists of small and medium farmer loans, 
financed through Government bonds. 
BNCR: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
BCR : Banco de Costa Rica 
BAC : Banco Anglo Costarricence 
BCAC: Banco Credito Agrf cola de Costa Rica 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Monetary Department of the Central 
Bank. 
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Table 3 
Costa Rica: National Banking System. 
Portfolio Distribution of Rescheduled Loans Under the FODEA Law, 
by Sector of Productive Activity and Source of Financing.• 
Cartera Propia 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Rest 
Fideicomiso 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Rest 
Cartera Propia 
Agriculture 
Livestock 
Rest 
BNCR 
28.7 
70.0 
1.3 
100.0 
40.1 
57.6 
~1J 
100.0 
June 1989. (Percentages) 
BCR 
34.l 
64.1 
1.9 
100.0 
25.0 
72.0 
3.Q 
100.0 
BAC 
29.8 
68.4 
1.8 
100.0 
33.4 
60.7 
2-~ 
100.0 
and Fideicomiso 
34.9 27.3 32.5 
63.2 70.0 62.7 
1.8 2.7 ~=a 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
BCAC 
38.3 
61.7 
o.o 
100.0 
59.6 
40.4 
Q.O 
100.0 
54.4 
45.6 
o.o 
100.0 
Total _ ... 
30.6 
68.0 
1.5 
100.0 
33.7 
63.0 
J • .a 
100.0 
32·. 7 
64.7 
2 .• 6, 
100.0 
* Cartera Propia consists mainly of large farmer loans, which each bank has· to finance 
with its own funds,. while Fideicomiso consists of small and medium farmer loans, 
financed through Government bonds. 
BNCR: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
BCR = Banco de Costa Rica 
BAC ~ Banco Anglo Costarricence 
BCAC: Banco Credito Agricola de Costa Rica 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Monetary Department of the Central 
Banlc. 
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Table 4 
Costa Rica: National Banking System. 
Portfolio Distribution of Rescheduled Loans Under the FODEA Law, 
by Source of Financing, and Sector of Productive Activity.* 
June 1989. (Percentages) 
BNCR BCR BAC BCAC Total 
Agriculture 
Carter a Propia 37.5 31.5 24.2 17.2 31.7 
Fideicomeso 6215 68.5 n~.8 82.8 6a13 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Livestock 
Cartera Propia 50.5 23.2 28.7 33.2 35.6 
Fidercomeso 49.5 7618 7J,.3 66.8 64.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rest 
Cartera Propia 31.8 17.5 9.9 o.o 18.9 
Fidercomeso 68.2 821~ 9Q.1 o.o ai.1 
100.0 100.0 100.0 o.o 100.0 
* Cartera Propia consists mainly of large farmer loans, which each bank has to finance 
with its own funds, while Fideicomiso consists of small and medium farmer loans, 
financed through Government bonds. 
BNCR: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
BCR : Banco de Costa Rica 
BAC : Banco Anglo Costarricence 
BCAC: Banco Credito Agricola de Costa Rica 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Monetary Department of the Central 
Bank. 
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Since the livestock and rice producers are characteristically larger than farmers in 
other activities, it is expected that the concentration of loans in those groups will cause 
the rescheduled portfolio to be highly concentrated in a small group of producers, as 
well. A as shown in Table 5, in the case of the Banco Nacional, 3,229 cattle producers 
rescheduled a total of CRSl,676.8 million, while 737 rice producers rescheduled CR$298.8 
million. In contrast, 1,855 com and beans producers rescheduled only CR$59.4 million. 
Total 
Livestock 
Rice 
Beans 
Corn 
Table 5 
Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica 
Distribution of the Number of Individuals, 
Total Debt and Average Loan in the FODEA Portfolio, 
by Products. (Thousand colones) 
Average Percentages 
Number AmOUnt Size Numb tr AmOUnt 
UH 2.886.557.7 328.9 100.0 100.0 
3229 1,676,800.7 519.3 36.8 58.1 
737 298,786.0 405.4 8.4 10.4 
664 21,360.9 32.2 7.6 0.7 
1191 38,065.8 32.0 13.6 1.3 
Other Agriculture 2845 760,506.0 267.3 32.4 26.3 
Other 
Source: 
110 91,038.4 827.6 1.3 3.2 
Data provided to the author by the Department of Economic Studies of the 
Banco Nacional. 
The concentration of the portfolio is highlighted by the difference in average size 
of loan in each group. Cattle and rice producers rescheduled, on average, CR$519,000 
and CR$405,000 per producer, respectively. Com and beans producers, on the other 
hand, rescheduled an average loan of CR$32,000. The differences among groups is also 
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shown by the fact that most of the cattle and rice producers that were rescheduled under 
FODEA were mostly financed through the Commercial Department of the Banco 
Nacional (50 percent of rice producers and 82 percent of cattle producers), while more 
than 95 percent of com and beans producers were financed by the Juntas Rurales. 
The concentration of the FODEA portfolio is accentuated when the distribution 
of the rescheduled loans within the groups is considered. On the one hand, 140 livestock 
producers, with loans of more than CR$2.5 million each, ( 4.3 percent of the number of 
borrowers who rescheduled), accounted for a total of CR$628 million (37.5 percent of 
the total amount), as shown in Table 6. On the other band, almost 2,000 producers, with 
loans of less than CR$250,000, ( 60 percent of those who rescheduled), accounted for 
CR$161.7 million (that is, less than 10 percent of the loans rescheduled by cattle 
producers at the Banco Nacional). Similarly, 25 rice producers, who represented only 3.4 
percent of those who rescheduled, accounted for CRS 132 million of the rice loans, or 
44.3 percent of the amount, while 440 producers (74.6 percent of the number) accounted 
for only CR$31 million (10.5 percent of the amount). 
Since the FODEA loan portfolio is highly concentrated in the livestock and rice 
sectors, it is expected to be concentrated in the regions where these products are 
dominant. As shown in Table 7, almost one-half of the FODEA portfolio of the Banco 
Nacional is from the Guanacaste region, while another one-sixth is from the San Carlos 
region, the two most important cattle producing regions of the country. Even though 
the concentration in these two regions is not as noticeable in the Banco de Costa Rica, 
since its Central Office in San Jos~ accounts for 11 percent of the FODEA portfolio, still 
more than 40 percent of the portfolio is from the Guanacaste and San Carlos regions. 
Loan 
Rice 
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Table 6 
Costa Rica: Banco Nacional de Costa Rica. 
Distribution of the Number of Individuals, 
Total Debt and Average Loan in the FODEA Portfolio, 
by Size of the Loans, for Rice and Livestock. 
(Thousand col ones) 
Average Perc~nt~ges 
Size Number AmOUnt Size Number Amo.ynt 
n:z. 298,786.0 405.4 lOQ.O J.00.0 
0-250 5·50 31,308.6 56.9 74.6 10.5 
250-1,000 114 61,944.4 543.4 15.5 20.7 
1,000-2,500 48 73,065.2 1,522.2 6.5 24.5 
More than 2,500 25 132,467.8 5,298.7 3.4 44.3 
Livestock 3229 1,676,800.7 519.3 100.0 100.0 
0-250 1933 161,655.0 83.6 59.9 9.6 
250-1,000 879 440,050.7 500.6 27.2 26.2 
1,000-2,500 277 446,456.6 1,611.8 8.6 26.6 
More than 2,500 140 628,638.4 4,490.3 4.3 37.5 
Source: Data provided to the author by the Department of Economic Studies of the 
Banco Nacional 
Table 7 
Costa Rica. Regional distribution of the 
FODEA Portfolio of the Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 
and the Banco de Costa Rica. 
Region 
Total 
Guanacaste 
San ·Carlos 
Atlantic 
South 
Rest 
Source: 
(Thousand col ones) 
BNCR BCR 
Amount % Amount % 
2,515,515 100.0 1,859,082 J,00.0 
1,176,414 46.8 493,926 26.6 
436,772 17.4 277,185 14.9 
256,328 10.2 157,800 8.5 
230,724 9.2 281,531 15.1 
415,279 16.5 648,640 34.9 
Data provided to the author by the 
Departments of Economic Studies of the 
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica and the Banco 
de Costa Rica. 
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Finally, the concentration of the FODEA portfolio is even greater if one con-
siders the number of loans per family nucleus. Large farmers tend to have loans under 
the name of several family members, while small farmers tend to have one loand per 
household. This is not taken into account in the data obtained from the Banco 
Nacional or Banco de Costa Rica, since each operation rescheduled under FODEA, 
although it may pool several loans, it belongs to one producer, not a family nucleus. 
Effects of FODEA on the Banks 
An earlier paper analyzing the potential effects of FODEA claimed that there 
were three possible sources of losses for the banks from the Law: interest revenue, 
default, and liquidity losses. 7 The liquidity and interest revenue losses were underes-
timated in that analysis, however, since the author's interpretation of the Law was 
different from the way in which it was finally implemented. 
The state-owned banks received Government bonds in exchange for the small and 
medium farmer loan portfolio. The banks still remain responsible, however, for the 
collection of these loans. The Law states that, if at the end of four years, there is any 
difference between what the bank has collected from the farmers and the bonds owned 
by the bank, the Government will pay the difference from the fiscal budget. It was 
assumed that the interest on these bonds (at an annual rate of 8 percent) would be paid 
annually by the Government to the banks. The interpretation of this legislation, how-
ever, has been that banks will not receive any interest on the bonds until the fifth year, 
when the difference between the amount collected by them and the interest rate on the 
bonds will be assessed. 
16 
In the case of the Banco Nacional, there will be a loss in interest revenue during 
the first four years of the FODEA Law, of approximately CR$548 million per year, if 
the totality of the loans in arrears are recovered. This will not only reduce the 
revenues of the bank, but it will also affect its liquidity position. 
It is interesting to note, with the purpose of estimating how much of the arrears 
portfolio would have been recovered by the banks if the FODEA law would not have 
been enacted, that approximately 10 percent of the FODEA portfolio of the Banco de 
Costa Rica had already been declared as non-recoverable (insoluto). Another 10 
percent of this portfolio was in process of being collected through the courts, while the 
remaining 80 percent was classified as overdue. 
The early estimates of a loss of CRS 1.3 billion in liquidity for the Banco 
Nacional, as a result of the FODEA Law, under the assumption that the banks would 
only recover 50 percent of their arrears portfolio in four years, seems a plausible 
estimate, then. If an estimated CR$270 million per year is added, in terms of interest 
revenue losses from FODEA, it is clear that the liquidity situation of the banks is 
greatly affected by this legislation. 8 
Possible EtTects of. FODEA II 
The main effect of the FODEA Il bill would come through the change in the 
classification by size of the arrears portfolio of the banks. First, there would be an 
increase in the amount of loans in the small farmer category. The Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica estimates that the number of borrowers in the small farmer category would 
increase from 12,289 to 12,481 loans, an increase of about CR$600 million. The 
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medium farmer category would decrease from 234 to 76, a decrease of about CR$400 
million, because of the transfer of borrowers to the small farmer category, and from the 
large farmer class. In other words, the 192 medium farmers transferred to the small 
farmer category would have an average size of loan of CR$3.1 million. There are also 
34 large farmers transferred to the medium farmer category, with an average size of 
loan of CR$6. 7 million. 
As a result, the subsidy granted under the FODEA law to farmers, due to the 
lower interest rate paid on the loans by those who qualify as small farmers, would 
increase. For the same reason, the banks will lose revenue from the new bill. Since 
the large farmer category is reduced, and the small and medium categories are enlarged, 
the banks must accept Government bonds, that pay 8 percent interest rate, instead of 
the 15 percent thay they might have received from large farmer loans under the 
previous rescheduling agreement of FODEA 
The Banco Nacional estimates that the interest revenue loss from the change in 
the distribution of the FODEA portfolio would be of about CR$33.4 million per year, 
during the first 4 years, and CR$52.4 million per year during the remaining 12 years. 
In addition to the additional borrowers shifted to the small farmer category, 
Congressman Muiioz Bustos argues that the number of farmers who would benefit from 
the rescheduling of loans, within all categories, would also increase. The increase would 
come about because of the new norms in the bill regarding the acceptance of collateral 
by the banks, that would encourage more farmers to approach the banks and sign the 
rescheduling papers .. The effect of the larger number of farmers in the FODEA port-
folio would be an increase in the revenue of the banks, since it would bring to the 
18 
banks some of the clients that are not paying at all at this moment. It is hard to 
estimate the effect that this may have on the banks, since it is not known how many 
farmers have not approached the banks. 
Actually, the banks argue that most of the farmers that have not signed the 
rescheduling papers have not done so because they have not wanted, and not because 
of the paperwork burden. At the Banco Nacional, only about 22 percent of the 
expected farmers that qualified for FODEA have not signed the paperwork. Most of 
these are large farmers, as shown in Table 1. Bank officials claim that these farmers 
are better off by not repaying the loans than by signing a rescheduling agreement. As 
a result, few additional loans would be rescheduled under the new bill. In many cases, 
farmers prefer to rely on alternative sources of credit, i.e. private banks, fina.nS<i~ras, and 
cooperatives, than to pay back the old loan to the state-owned bank, and thus risk 
losing their land, by signing the FODEA papers. 
Even if not many new farmers approach the banks, there still is a significant 
increase in the amount of loans to be financed with Government bonds. The bill calls 
for an increase of CR$5 billion, but most probably less than that would have to be 
used. The increase in bonds would not affect the budget deficit, or have any infla-
tionary effects at this moment, since it is just a swap of debt from the state-owned 
banks to the Ministry of Finance. After the fourth year, however, when the Govern-
ment must pay the residual that the banks have not collected from the farmers and 
interest on the bonds, a payment that must go through the fiscal budget, inflationary 
pressures may increase. 
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Conclusions 
Even though it is hard to estimate the effects of the FODEA Il bill on the 
banks, some losses should be expected. On the one hand, there is the loss in revenue 
and in liquidity, caused by the decreased interest revenue that the increase of the small 
farmer category would cause. On the other hand, there is the possible increase of 
revenue, caused by the rescheduling of farmers who are presently inactive in their pay-
ments. 
In any case, the most dangerous effect of _the bill is the addition of the norm 
calling for a moratorium of the debt of farmers in trouble. Even though this is not an 
obligatory moratory, it sends the wrong kind of signal. Farmers would expect the 
moratorium to take effect almost immediately, at the first sign of trouble. Some other 
farmers might declare a ~ fil'1Q automatic moratorium themselves, and not repay their 
loans. Additionally, some groups could use this norm to put pressure on the banks to 
declare a moratorium of all their loans in the future. As a result, the call for a mora-
torium not only affects the farmers being rescheduled under the FODEA law, but it also 
affects the repayment of all the loans of the National Banking System, as the Ministry 
of Agriculture already warned the Agricultural Commission of Congress. 
The final long-term effect on the banks of the approval of the FODEA II bill, 
therefore, will be a negative one. The possible benefits derived by some farmers, on 
the other hand, could be substantial. Even though almost half of the FODEA portfolio 
of the entire banking system is classified as small farmer loans, the concentration of the 
benefits in a few farmers, particularly livestock producers, mostly in the Guanacaste 
region, is great. In addition, most of the farmers that have not rescheduled under the 
20 
FODEA law are large farmers. As a result, the increase in Government bonds and 
reclassification of the farmer-size categories proposed by the FODEA II bill may result 
in an increased concentration of the benefits derived by the farmers. 
On the other hand, the changes proposed by the bill to facilitate the paperwork 
for rescheduling under the FODEA terms are not substantial, while the benefits of not 
repaying the defaulted loans still outweigh the costs of not doing it for most farmers'. 
It should be expected, therefore, that the number of new farmers that would reschedule 
under the bill is not that great. 
In conclusion, even though not many new farmers may reschedule under the new 
FODEA II terms, the approval of the bill would result in an increased concentration of 
the rescheduled agricultural default portfolio of the National Banking System. As a 
result, the additional subsidy received by the new farmers being rescheduled, and those 
being reclassified into the preferential interest rate categories, would also be greatly 
concentrated in a few hands. 
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The FODEA law is analyzed in greater detail in Luis Mesalles, "Costa Rica: The 
Political Economy of Agricultural Credit," unpublished paper, Agricultural Finance 
Program, The Ohio State University, March 1988. 
There is no relationship between this article in the FODEA II bill and the 
recently enacted "Fideicomiso Airario" (Agrarian Trust). Even though the banks 
may assign a given farm to the "Fideicomiso," they are not forced by the bill to 
do so. 
The FODEA Law intended to do the same thing, but because of its wording, the 
banks have interpreted it not to allow this to happen, and some farmers in this 
position have complained when they have been left out of the rescheduling 
process. 
It was not possible to obtain a draft of this bill, since it still is at an initial stage 
of discussion, during which the Ministry of Agriculture is asking the banks to make 
suggestions. 
There are some rumors of an agreement among both major parties to let the 
deliverations prolong until there is no time for approval of the bill. 
The banks are not keeping . a detailed record of the number of farmers in each 
of the size categories. Each bank branch maintains a detailed record of the 
FODEA transactions so that, in order to obtain information about the number of 
small, medium and large farmers who have rescheduled, the Central Office of each 
bank must call each branch and ask them to compute it for them. 
See Annex I of Mesalles (Ql2,.. ~) 
Again, assuming a 50 percent recovery rate on the interest rate payments. 
